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I. INTRODUCTION
N FEBRUARY OF 2013, US Airways and American Airlines an-
nounced they had come to terms on a merger. The $11 bil-
lion combination was poised to create the world's largest
airline.' It also represented the fourth mega-airline merger
since 2008.2 Each of these deals helped the newly combined air-
line steady itself in the unstable airline market. The Department
of Justice (DOJ), which is tasked with analyzing potential anti-
trust issues in the mergers, cleared the other mergers for takeoff
with little to no issue. Despite allowing these other mergers, the
DOJ announced in August of 2013 that it was going to challenge
1 Chris Isidore, US Airways-American Airlines to Merge, CNN MONEY (Feb. 14,
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/ 14/news/companies/us-airways-ameri-
can-airlines-merger/index.html.
2 Tal Yellin, The Runway to the Final Four, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn
.com/infographic/news/companies/airline-merger (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
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the proposed US Airways and American Airlines merger as an
antitrust violation. This move "surprise [d]" many in business in
the airline industry and came as a shock to the leaders of the to-
be-formed American Airlines, who had previously said "they
were not worried about getting antitrust approval," based in
large part on the DOJ's lenient stance on the previously ap-
proved mega-airline mergers.4
The antitrust battle between the "new" American and the DOJ
continued for months before the DOJ finally announced that it
would allow the merger.' This announcement came at great cost
to the new airline, however, as the DOJ concurrently announced
that in exchange for approval, American agreed to give up hun-
dreds of millions of dollars worth of airport gates and slots at
major airports and to forgo future business at these locations.6
The airline industry, which had seen four major deals approved
in the previous eight years with almost no resistance from the
DOJ, was stunned.7
While American Airlines is finally and formally merged, the
staunch resistance that it faced leaves a question behind: Why
did the DOJ deviate so drastically from the course it took in pre-
vious airline mergers? This comment seeks to answer this ques-
tion and will look at the legal reasons that the DOJ explicitly
announced in its challenge of the new American. Finding these
to be insufficient, however, this comment will turn to other im-
plicit reasons for the challenge that may have been the driving
force behind the DOJ's resistance to the merger. These reasons
in both policy and politics help to serve as a forecast for how the
DOJ may treat future mega-mergers in the airline industry and
in other unrelated industries.
3 Complaint 13, United States v. US Airways Grp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C.
Apr. 25, 2014) (No. 13-01236), 2013 WL 4055128.
4 Gregory Karp, Justice Department Sues to Block US Airways-American Merger, CHi.
TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://articies.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-13/business/
chi-us-airways-american-merger-20130813_1_ceo-tom-horton-us-airways-american-
american-airlines.
5 See Press Release, Justice Department Requires US Airways and American Air-
lines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-Wide Competi-
tion and Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-requires-us-airways-and-american-airines-divest-faciities-
seven-key [hereinafter Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to
Divest Facilities].
6 Id.
7 See Marilyn Geewax, DOJ Suit Seen Delaying, Not Killing Big Airline Merger, NPR
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/13/211729307/doj-suit-seen-de-
laying-not-killing-big-airline-merger.
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The comment is broken down into six parts. Part A discusses
the legal requirements of an airline merger. Part B provides
background information regarding previous airline mergers and
how they were treated by the DOJ. Part C discusses the particu-
lars of the American Airlines/US Airways deal. Part D discusses
some of the reasons the DOJ challenged the merger as put forth
in its Complaint. Part E speaks to other reasons why the DOJ
may have challenged the merger so strictly in light of the other
previously approved mergers. Finally, Part F predicts how this
merger will affect future mergers in both the airline industry
and other unrelated industries.
The DOJ's departure in the American merger from its recent
record of approving mergers stunned many. While the deal
looked very similar to many of its predecessors from a purely
legal standpoint, the DOJ's resistance stands as a lesson to those
in both the airline industry and the general business community
that there are many factors to consider when seeking federal
approval for a merger. This comment seeks to shed light on
these factors in hopes that those considering merger in the fu-
ture may be able to avoid the unexpected turbulence that Amer-
ican Airlines and US Airways encountered.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY OVER AIRLINE MERGERS
First, a brief introduction is required to introduce the laws
important to airline mergers and the governmental bodies that
enforce these laws. Antitrust law, as a whole, has developed out
of the longstanding need to carefully balance the government's
role in limiting anticompetitive economic activity without nega-
tively impacting precompetitive economic activity within the
United States economy. There is sometimes confusion as to the
main goals of these laws,' but they undoubtedly play an impor-
tant role in shaping the modern American economy. Antitrust
laws in the United States trace their way back to the Sherman
Act, which prohibits business actions that are in "restraint of
trade," without expressly defining what exactly this means. 9 Over
time, other statutes and case law have added some clarity to the
"restraint of trade" language for specific economic areas. With
8 See Catherine A. Peterman, Comment, The Future of Airline Mergers After the US
Airways and American Airlines Merger, 79 J. AIR L. & COM. 781, 783 n.7 (2014)
(discussing tension noted in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Monograph No. 12,
Horizontal Mergers: Law and Policy 5-7 (1986)).
9 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1, 2 (2012).
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regard to airline mergers, the governing statutory provisions are
within Section 7 of the Clayton Act."° This section prohibits
mergers that "substantially . . lessen competition."11 Whether
or not the merger has a substantial impact on competition is
one of the main points of contention that antitrust enforcement
agencies have raised in regard to airline mergers.
A. AIRLINE MERGER REGULATION PRIOR TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
While the Clayton Act gives a statutory basis for challenging
airline mergers, different regulatory bodies over time have had
the power to enforce this rule. In 1938, Congress gave regula-
tory authority over the newly formed and booming airline indus-
try to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).12 The CAB used its
authority to promote the status quo of the airline industry, dis-
couraging both the failure and creation of major airlines.1 3 The
stability of this time was radically altered when leadership in
Washington and within the CAB determined that the airline in-
dustry should be able to compete and grow within itself.14
After determining that the CAB was no longer in the best po-
sition to promote this new freer airline industry, Congress
signed into law the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978.15 This act
brought new life into the airline industry, which was beginning
to stagnate in the wake of the energy crisis, reduced air travel,
and increased fees-all due in large part to the rigidity of the
CAB administration. 6 In addition to this shift in regulation, the
Airline Deregulation Act also appointed the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to oversee potential airline mergers. 7
The DOT took a completely different approach to airline
mergers than the CAB. The DOT was exceedingly friendly to the
proposed mergers, and in the 1980s it approved almost every
10 Id. § 18.
11 Id.
12 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. app. 401-722 (repealed 1958).
13 Jeff Mosteller, Comment, The Current and Future Climate of Airline Consolida-
tion: The Possible Impact of an Alliance of Two Large Airline and an Examination of the
Proposed American Airlines-British Airways Alliance, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 575, 577
(1999).
14 Id.
15 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. 1551(a) (7) (1958) (repealed 1994)).
16 Fred L. Smith Jr. & Braden Cox, Airline Deregulation, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ECON. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ArlineDeregula-
tion.html.
17 Mosteller, supra note 13, at 577 (citing the Airline Deregulation Act).
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merger with which it was presented.18 In fact, many of the air-
lines that are discussed in the remainder of this article, and in-
deed much of the airline industry as a whole, were part of
mergers that occurred between 1978 and 1988.1 While the
DOT was allowing these mergers to take place, new financial
problems arose that again began to clip the wings of the airline
industry. °
B. THE DOJ's AUTHORITY OVER AIRLINE MERGERS
The Airline Deregulation Act provided the DOT with author-
ity over airlines until January 1, 1989.1 In consideration of the
extensive financial losses realized in the airline industry over the
preceding years, Congress decided to let the DOT's authority
expire on that date.22 Thereafter, authority to govern the airline
industry passed to the DOJ's antitrust department.23 This new
authority was quickly met with a change in the airline industry
when Kuwait was invaded in 1990 and oil prices doubled over-
night.24 In turn, as many major airlines began to file for bank-
ruptcy, the merger-packed 1980s began to slow down
substantially.25 It appeared that the DOJ's chance to review ma-
jor airline mergers would have to wait for a little bit longer.
III. PREVIOUS TREATMENT OF AIRLINE MERGERS
A. EARLY DOJ TREATMENT OF AIRLINE MERGERS
While this comment focuses on the DOJ's recent move to-
wards a more heady response to proposed airline mergers, it
should be noted that before the DOJ allowed the mergers of the
major airlines discussed below, this hard stance is not unprece-
dented under the DOJ's regulation. In 1989, shortly after receiv-
ing its authority, the DOJ moved to block a transfer of airline
18 See Alberto G. Rossi, Comment, Grounding Future Consolidation: United-US Air-
ways Cancel Flight, 54 ADmIN. L. REV. 883, 887 n.14 (2002).
19 See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 578 (noting that between 1978-1988 there
were some 51 mergers in the airlines industry).
20 Id. at 579 (noting that the airline industry suffered loss of $280 million in
1980 and $900 million in 1982).
21 Id. at 578.
22 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. 1551(a)(7) (1958), repealed 1994).
23 Id.
24 Mosteller, supra note 13, at 579.
25 Id.
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gates between Eastern Airline and other airlines. 26 Shortly there-
after, in 1991, the DOJ's lawsuit against US Airways and British
Airways blocked a proposed joint investment between the two
airlines.27
In 1998, the DOJ took another step to assert its power over
airline mergers. After Northwest Airlines announced its plan to
acquire a controlling share of Continental Airline's stock-a
merger of the fourth and fifth largest airlines at the time2 8 -the
DOJ brought a lawsuit to block the merger.29 The DOJ felt that
the merger would violate the "substantially... lessen competi-
tion in interstate trade and commerce" language of antitrust
laws.3 The airlines abandoned their consolidation plans follow-
ing the lawsuit.
One more group of airlines, however, attempted to steer
around this new stormy DOJ, when US Airways and United Air-
lines announced their plans to merge in May of 2000.31 The
DOJ, however, announced that it would sue to stop this combi-
nation and the deal was ultimately abandoned. 32 Then Attorney
General John Ashcroft noted that this merger would hurt both
competition and consumers. 3 While Ashcroft admitted that
"mergers [in the airline industry] can further competition
.... it appeared that the DOJ was, nevertheless, somewhat
hesitant to allow these mergers.
Many in the airline industry felt the DOJ was "sending a mes-
sage" that the pro-merger atmosphere under the Department of
Transportation was officially gone. 5 Many also took this as a
sign that the DOJ was not going to allow mergers among the five
26 Rossi, supra note 18; United States v. USAir Group, Inc., Public Comments
and Response on Proposed Final Judgment, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,996 (1993).
27 Rossi, supra note 18; United States v. USAir Group, Inc., Public Comments
and Response on Proposed Final Judgment, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,996 (1993).
28 U.S. Sues to Halt Merger of Northwest, Continental Plan Would Unfairly Limit Com-
petition, Justice Dept. Claims, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 24, 1998), http://articles.balti
moresun.com/1998-10-24/business/19982970441-continental-airlines-north
west-and-continental-two-airlines.
29 Complaint, United States v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (arguing merger violates the Clayton Act).
3o Id. 42.
31 Press Release, Department of Justice and Several States Will Sue to Stop





35 U.S. Sues To Halt Merger of Northwest, supra note 28.
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largest airlines at .the time: Delta, United, American, Northwest,
and Continental. 6
B. DELTA AND NORTHWEST AIRLINES
As time passed from the DOJ's 2001 rejection of the US Air-
ways/United merger, the airline industry continued to face "de-
teriorating industry conditions" and many major airlines went
into bankruptcy. 7 The airline industry needed to change the
course of this deterioration, and despite the previous DOJ rejec-
tions, it appeared that in these desperate times at least a few
airlines were willing to attempt a merger.
In April 2008, Delta Airlines announced that it was planning
to acquire Northwest Airlines in a $3.1 billion deal. 8 This deal
would lead to the creation of the world's largest airline at the
time.39 While both of these companies had recently gone into
bankruptcy, this combination allowed the two companies to
pool many of their resources and to expand their flight sched-
ule.40 These changes, while not necessarily harmonious at first,4 1
could provide a testing ground to prove that mergers between
large airlines could work.42 Many believed that mergers like this
were needed to help turn around the struggling airline industry.
The DOJ's approval was necessary before the merger could
actually take place. This approval was far from a foregone con-
clusion. In light of the previous rejections, many expected a
long and arduous argument opposing the merger from the
DOJ. However, no such argument was made; instead the DOJ's
approval of the merger was announced in a single page press
36 Id.; Rossi, supra note 18, at 377.
37 Susan Carey & Paulo Prada, Delta, Northwest Agree to Merge; May Start Trend,
WALL ST.J. (Apr. 15, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12082105
3431914201; Yellin, supra note 2 (chart shows that between 2000 and 2008, five of
the top ten U.S. airlines went into bankruptcy, including both Delta and
Northwest).
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release in October of the same year.4 3 The DOJ said the com-
bined airline would not "substantially lessen competition."44 The
Department went further still and praised the merger by saying
that it felt the merger would produce "substantial and credible
efficiencies."4 The statement did include language that the rul-
ing in this merger should not be taken as binding authority as to
how the DOJ would rule in future mergers.46 However, as the
next major airline merger took place only a few short years after
the Delta/Northwest deal was given DOJ approval, the airline
industry felt that the DOJ had shown its hand and was more
willing to accept airline mergers.
C. UNITED AND CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
Shortly after the Delta/Northwest merger, other airlines be-
gan seeking partners to help them compete with the new airline
giant. In 2008, United and Continental began to consider merg-
ing, but talks broke down shortly thereafter.47 United continued
searching for a partner, including US Airways.48 However, in
May of 2010, United and Continental finally decided that it was
time to announce plans for a $3.2 billion merger that would cre-
ate the largest airline in the world.49
While the previous allowance for the Delta/Northwest merger
gave some hope that the DOJ would allow this merger as well,
antitrust approval was far from guaranteed.5 ° On top of the un-
certainty of how the DOJ would view this deal, there was the
concern that the deal would not be approved. The DOJ had re-
cently undergone changes in its makeup following President
43 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of Department of Justice's Anti-
trust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Merger of Delta
Airlines Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www
.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-at-963.html [hereinafter Press




47 Aaron Smith, United and Continental to Merge, CNN MONEY (May 3, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/03/news/companies/
UnitedContinentalmerge/.
48 United-US Airways Merger Dead, ABC NEWS (July 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go
.com/Business/story?id=87893.
49 Smith, supra note 47.
50 United and Continental Announce Merger, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 3, 2010),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/united-and-continental-announce-
merger/?r=0 (noting that there are "still major hurdles to clear," including anti-
trust concerns).
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Obama's election in 2008.51 The President had campaigned
hard against a previous "lax enforcement" of antitrust issues,52
and when Eric Holder was named as the new Attorney General,
many expected him to follow through with President Obama's
desires.
Despite this concern, the DOJ announced that it would ap-
prove the merger in August of 2010, just three months after the
initial merger had been announced. The DOJ announced that
it had granted its acceptance "in light of an agreement" between
Continental and United that it felt limited the antitrust issues.54
While such an agreement may sound like a capitulation on the
part of Continental and United, the deal ultimately resulted in
the new United Airlines transferring a limited number of airport
slots at Newark Liberty Airport to Southwest Airlines. 5 5 The DOJ
noted that giving up these few slots "resolve[d] the depart-
ment's principal competition concerns. "56
While these slots were more than the DOJ had required of
Delta/Northwest, it appeared that these concessions were mini-
mal at most. The DOJ had once again allowed a major airline to
merge, and in doing so appeared to signal that the others air-
lines were free to attempt a merger.
D. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES AND AiRTRAN
Shortly after the new United was approved, Southwest Airlines
announced its plans to acquire AirTran in September 2010."7
51 See Press Release, Office of the President-Elect, President-Elect Obama An-
nounces Key Department of Justice Posts, http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/
president-electobama announces-key-department-of justice-posts/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 16, 2015).
52 Michael Bobelin, Uptick in Antitrust Enforcement Falls Short of Obama's Promises,
FORBES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2012/
02/14/uptick-in-antitrust-enforcement-falls-short-of-obamas-promises/.
53 Compare Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, United Airlines and Continental Air-
lines Transfer Assets to Southwest Airlines in Response to Department ofJustice's
Antitrust Concerns (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-air-
lines-and-continental-airlines-transfer-assets-southwest-airlines-response (approv-
ing the deal in three months), with Press Release, Merger of Delta and Northwest,
supra note 43 (the approval of the Delta/Northwest deal took six months).




57 Mike Esterl, Discount Carriers Southwest Airlines, AirTran Tie Knot, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704654004575
517510208350940.
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This combination was one of the first between (to borrow a col-
lege football denotation) "non-Power 5" airlines under the
DOJ's watch.58 Southwest was typically seen, and even treated by
the DOJ, as a "low cost carrier ' 59 that had never before entered
into acquisition territory.6" This purchase would allow Southwest
to begin to compete with some major airlines and give South-
west its first international flights.61
In approaching the antitrust questions, however, there was
still cause for concern. AirTran and Southwest served about
thirty of the same cities,62 a major overlap compared to the pre-
viously approved mergers.63 While similar overlaps had given the
DOJ pause and were noted as an underlying reason for the DOJ
asking United to give up certain airport slots (to Southwest, in-
terestingly enough),b4 the DOJ announced its approval of the
merger in a one page announcement.6 5 The release simply
stated "the division has determined that the merger is not likely
to substantially lessen competition."6 6
IV. THE AMERICAN AND US AIRWAYS MERGER
A. THE DEAL
In light of these recent mergers, American Airlines and US
Airways both saw their rankings among the major airlines fall.6"
In addition, rising workforce prices were hurting the airline in-
dustry as a whole. Many major airlines were forced into bank-
ruptcy, including the ones that resulted from previous
58 Id.
59 Press Release, United Airlines and Continental Airlines Transfer Assets,
supra note 53.
60 Esterl, supra note 57.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Press Release, United Airlines and Continental Airlines Transfer Assets,
supra note 53.
64 Id.
65 Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Statement of the Department ofJustice Anti-
trust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Southwest's Acquisition
of AirTran (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-depart-
ment-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investigation.
66 Id.
67 Chris Isidore & Blake Ellis, American Airlines Files for Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/29/news/companies/ameri-
can airlines..bankruptcy/ (noting American was world's largest airline until
2006, when mergers pushed it back to third).
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mergers-Continental in 1990,68 United in 2002,69 and Delta in
2005.70 Bankruptcy allowed these airlines to restructure their
company and shed extra labor "baggage. '71 US Airways also filed
for bankruptcy in both 200272 and 2004 7 and was still looking to
regain its status as an elite airline. American Airlines was one of
the last major airlines to declare bankruptcy in December of
2011. Its CEO at the time noted the bankruptcy was due in large
part to American's inability to keep up with the other airlines
that had already restructured themselves. 4 Between 2007 and
2011, American lost $4.8 billion primarily because of an $800
million per year difference in labor costs between American's
workforce and the workforces of the restructured airlines.75
American hoped to use the bankruptcy court's power to allow
the qualified petitioner to void collectively bargained agree-
ments, as permitted by § 1113 of the bankruptcy code.76
These efforts to restructure workforce agreements and to
reestablish their place as major airlines ultimately led both
American and US Airways, like the other major airlines before
them, to merge to create the world's largest airline.
B. THE COMPLAINT AND CONCESSIONS
The initial complaint against American and US Airways and
the concessions that the DOJ insisted on in exchange for ap-
proval give insights into how the DOJ viewed the merger.
68 Agis Salpukas, Continental Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/04/business/continental-files-for-bankruptcy
.html.
69 Timeline of United Airlines' Bankruptcy, USATODAY.coM (Feb. 1, 2006, 7:32
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-02-01-united-time-
linex.htm.
70 Yellin, supra note 2.
71 See Max Schatzow, An Alternative Universe to § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Meditation Between American Airlines and Its Workforce, 10 RUTGERS Bus. LJ. 1, 3
(2013); Chris Isidore, Delta Air Lines Files for Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY (Sept. 15,
2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/14/news/fortune5OO/delta/.
72 See Schatzow, supra note 71; Patty Davis, US Air Files for Bankruptcy, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 12, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/08/11/news/companies/
usair/.
73 See Schatzow, supra note 71; US Air Files Chapter 11, CNN MONEY (Sept. 13,
2004), http://money.cnn.com/2004/09/12/news/fortune5OO/usairbank/index
.htm?cnn=yes.
74 See Schatzow, supra note 71; Isidore & Ellis, supra note 67.
75 Isidore & Ellis, supra note 67.
76 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b).
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1. The Complaint
The DOJ's civil antitrust suit against American and US Airways
was signed by the U.S. Attorney General as well as by those with
the same position in several states, 77 including Arizona 78 and
Texas79 where the airlines were headquartered. The Complaint
claimed that the merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act
because it would "likely substantially lessen competition, and
tend to create a monopoly. 8°
The DOJ advanced a number of points of contention against
the proposed merger. Each of these points fits into five major
arguments against the merger. Of these five main arguments,
four are discussed in great detail later in the comment as poten-
tial reasons the DOJ strictly reviewed this merger. The other ar-
gument, increased market concentration,8 ' has been addressed
by other comments on this complaint8 2 and therefore will not be
discussed in great detail. The remaining arguments used by the
DOJ to challenge the proposed merger are as follows: (1) the
proposed merger was not necessary for the individual airlines to
succeed; (2) a move to only four major airlines would poten-
tially be anticompetitive; (3) other airlines, especially smaller
airlines, needed government protection; and (4) the DOJ has a
mandate to protect consumers.83
2. The Concessions
After the Complaint was filed, the DOJ announced that it
would allow the merger but only after American agreed to cer-
tain concessions. 8 These concessions represented the "sticking
points" of the merger, which the DOJ was unable to allow. These
concessions give insight beyond the arguments listed in the
DOJ's complaint as to why it felt the merger was anticompetitive.
These concessions may also give insight to how the DOJ may
rule in the future.
77 See generally Complaint, supra note 3.
78 US AIRwAYs, http://www.usairways.com/en-US/contact/general.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015).
79 AMERICAN AIRLINES, http://www.aa.com/il8n/amrcorp/corporateInforma-
tion/facts/structure.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
80 Complaint, supra note 3, 13.
81 Id. 37.
82 See generally Peterman, supra note 8.
83 See Complaint, supra note 3.
84 Press Release,Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities, supra
note 5.
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The major requirement of the merger imposed by the DOJ
was the divestment of slots and gates at various "key" airports to
low-cost carrier airlines.85 This concession has two points. First,
is the divestment of the slots and gates. Slots are defined in the
Complaint as being necessary at a few airports for takeoff and
landings.86 Gates are similar and are typically assigned to an air-
line to fly in and out of. In the concessions, the new American
airlines was required to give up all 104 "air carrier" slots it had at
Reagan National airport (one of the airports the DOJ listed it
was specifically concerned would be affected by the merger);87
thirty-four slots at LaGuardia International Airport; and two
gates each at Boston Logan Airport, Chicago O'Hare Airport,
Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International Airport, and Miami
International Airport.88
The second part of the concession of slots and gates was that
the gates given up were to go to "low cost carrier airlines" or
"LCCs." The International Civil Aviation Organization defines
LCCs as carriers that have low-cost structures as compared to
other airlines and that offer low fares and rates.89 Some of the
most widely recognized LCCs include JetBlue and Southwest
Airlines, each of which received advantageous opportunities
through the slot divestment.9" These LCCs were given benefits
by the DOJ in an effort to "enhance system-wide competition"
and to allow for "more competitive airfares for consumers."91
The Reagan slots were to be sold to other low cost airlines,
includingJetBlue and Southwest Airlines. 92 This alone was a ma-
jor blow to the new American. The slots at Reagan, which were
valued at over $2 million, were described by the DOJ as expen-
sive, difficult to obtain, and rarely changing hands between air-
lines.93 While the new American was able to keep the proceeds
85 Id.
86 See Complaint, supra note 3, 31.
87 Id.
88 See Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
89 International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Glossary, http://www.icao
.int/dataplus archive/Documents/GLOSSARY.docx.




93 See Complaint, supra note 3, 30.
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from the sale of these valuable slots, 4 it was nevertheless a multi-
million dollar jab to the new American before it even started. It
was nothing short of a startling demand, unique in all of the
examined DOJ's merger challenges.
In addition to its enormous impact on the new American and
LCCs, the divestment concession gives light to the DOJ's reasons
for staunchly opposing the American merger. It is clear from
the Complaint and from these demands that the DOJ felt it
needed to intervene. While the merger was ultimately permit-
ted, it is impossible to say that the new American was let off easy
by the DOJ. Just why the DOJ held American to such strict re-
view will be explored next.
V. EXPLICIT REASONS BEHIND THE DOJ'S CHALLENGE
As mentioned above, the DOJ put forth four major arguments
for why it was challenging the merger. 5 The four arguments
raised by the DOJ were that: (1) both airlines could succeed in-
dependently without the merger; (2) the reduction in the num-
ber of major airlines would lead to anticompetitive results; (3)
the merger would hurt smaller airlines; and (4) consumers
would be harmed by the merger.9 6 Each argument, however,
had its own shortcomings.
Further, these arguments do not appear to fully account for
the DOJ's strict treatment of the American Airlines/US Airways
merger. Their shortcomings appear either when applying the
argument to the instant merger or when comparing the DOJ's
treatment here with previously approved mergers. These issues
are highlighted in a subsection for each argument the DOJ
brought against American Airlines.
In short, this comment notes that the DQJ's explicit argu-
ments do not add up to the treatment that the American Air-
lines merger received. Thus, in Section E infra, other potential
reasons underlying the DOJ's harsh ruling on American Airlines
are addressed as well.
94 See Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5 (noting the gates would be "sold").
95 Supra Section IV.B.1.
96 See Complaint, supra note 3.
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A. No NEED TO MERGE
1. The DOJ's Position
One argument the DOJ made against the merger was that it
was not necessary for the success of either company. The Com-
plaint argued that both American and US Airways "can and will
compete effectively as standalone companies. '97 The DOJ at-
tempted to develop this argument by pointing to the recent per-
formance of the two airlines, noting that US Airways had
"record profits" in 201298 and American Airlines was "one of the
most recognized" brands in the world.9 9 The DOJ further points
to a "standalone business plan" that American Airlines adopted
to get out of bankruptcy and restore "American to industry lead-
ership."'100 This plan included American placing the "largest or-
der for new aircraft in the industry's history" in 2011.1 From
these arguments it does appear, admittedly, that the two airlines
could continue to operate independently. The DOJ used this
point to argue that the two airlines should stay apart. If this were
the case, why would the business minds of each of the compa-
nies decide to merge? Assuming that the merger was not strictly
for anticompetitive purposes, which even the DOJ did not say is
the case, both US Airways and American Airlines clearly felt that
the merger put them in a better business position.
2. Issues with the DOJ's Argument
In 2005, prior to any of the major mergers mentioned here,
American Airlines was the number one airline in the world and
US Airways was near the top of the rankings as well. At the time
of their proposed merger, American and US Airways were the
"smallest of the . . . airlines."'01 2 The DOJ uses this fact in its
Complaint to argue that the two airlines had incentives to grow
and compete aggressively on their own. In reality, however, it is
a reason why blocking the merger would be unfair. All of the
airlines in the industry compete with each other for "razor-thin






102 See id. 81.
103 Ashley Lutz & Gus Lubin, Airlines Have an Insanely Small Profit Margin, Bus.
INSIDER (June 15, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/airlines-have-a-small-
profit-margin-2012-6 (stating the average domestic flight makes 1% profit).
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ous mergers allowed airlines to stay profitable despite these mar-
gins. 104 Therefore, while the merger may allow American and
US Airways tojoin forces in ways that allow them to keep up with
the other airlines, it would be unfair to stop this merger after
allowing the others.
Many felt that "the time for the DOJ to act was five or six years
ago when this wave of mergers started. ' 10 5 Airline and business
analysts alike believe that the Justice Department's obstruction
of the American merger was unfair to the new airline in light of
previous approvals of airline mergers. These previous approvals
put the DOJ in an "indefensible position."106 Once the DOJ al-
lowed the creation of the "super-Delta" and the "super-United,"
they almost "had to create a super-American."10' To do other-
wise would put both US Airways and American at a distinct dis-
advantage when trying to compete with their merged
counterparts.
Additionally, the DOJ has put forth a set of Merger Guidelines
that encapsulate the "principal analytical techniques, practices
and enforcement policy of the Department of Justice" in review-
ing proposed mergers.10 8 While these Guidelines are not
mandatory authority, 109 they show the public and interested
businesses what the DOJ is looking at when making its decision.
The Guidelines Overview states that the DOJ specifically seeks to
"avoid ... unnecessary interference with mergers that are com-
petitively beneficial or [even] neutral."110 The Guidelines fur-
ther point out "a primary benefit of mergers. .. is [to] enhance
the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete," '111 and that
these "efficiencies" include allowing "two ineffective competitors
to form a more effective competitor."'1 12 Further, the Guidelines
never mention the "need" to merge as a point that should be
104 Id.
105 Karp, supra note 4.
106 Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, Justice Dept. Clears Merger of 2 Airlines,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/
12/u-s-said-to-be-near-settling-american-us-airways-merger-lawsuit/?_r=0.
107 Id.
108 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachements/merger-review/ lO0819hmg.pdf
[hereinafter HoRIzororAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
109 See generally Peterman, supra note 8 (citing FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.,
548 F.3d 1028, 1046 (5th Cir. 2008)).
110 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 4.
111 Id. at 29.
112 Id.
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considered in judging the merger, despite the DOJ making this
argument in the Complaint." 3
The DOJ is fully aware, as is shown by these points within its
own Guidelines, that mergers are sometimes necessary to allow
effective competition. In the case of American/US Airways, it
appears that the business leaders of the two airlines and industry
analysts believed that this merger would allow the new American
to compete more effectively with the other recently merged air-
lines. This belief held by the heads of the two major corpora-
tions does not lend itself to questioning by the DOJ; thus, an
argument that there is no need to merge does not seem to hold
much weight. While it may be true that the airlines did "not
need this merger to . . . survive," it appears that the airlines'
leaders felt that it was, in fact, necessary for them to thrive in
competition with recently merged airlines.'14
B. COORDINATED EFFORTS OF THE NEW AIRLINES
1. The DOJ's Position
The DOJ also raised a concern about the increasing concen-
tration among airlines. While one commentator noted that he
did not see "much difference" '"1 between this merger and the
ones that the DOJ previously approved, the DOJ did point to, at
a very broad level, at least one important difference. Undoubt-
edly, the previous mergers reduced the number of major air-
lines. However, the DOJ appeared especially cautious with this
merger because it reduced the "number of major domestic air-
lines from five to four.""1 6 While this may seem like an un-
spectacular distinction, the DOJ was more concerned about this
drop than it was with any of the other airline mergers. 1 7 This
reduction, the DOJ feared, would cause both increased market
concentration (which, as mentioned above, will not be ad-
dressed in depth in this comment)"18 and enhanced coordi-
nated behavior between the major airlines.
11 See generally HoRIzoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 108.
114 See Complaint, supra note 3, 1 12.
115 Alex Davies, Justice Department to Airlines: Your Days of Mega-Consolidation
Mergers Are Over, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/
doj-block-of-airline-merger-shows-new-policy-201 3-8.
116 Complaint, supra note 3, 1 1.
117 See id. 1 34-35 (describing the other airline mergers as less offensive based
on the end number of airlines).
11 See generally Peterman, supra note 8.
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Coordinated behavior is discussed in the DOJ's Merger
Guidelines as "coordinated interactions" involving "conduct by
multiple firms that are profitable for each of them only as a re-
sult of the accommodating reactions of the others."11 The DOJ
appeared to be especially wary of allowing this combination be-
cause it felt it would increase the likelihood of such interactions,
noting "the structure of the airline industry is already conducive
to coordinated behavior. '12 0 The industry structure includes
"few large players [that] dominate the industry; each transaction
is small; and most pricing is readily transparent.
1 2
'
The Complaint goes on to detail how airlines set their prices
for flights. This process includes careful consideration of oppo-
nent's prices as well as wariness of the potential that a competi-
tor could react to a price that would be considered
"aggressive.' 22 A major aspect of this process, according to the
DOJ, is the use of "'cross-market incentives' or 'CMIs'" that are
used to prevent fare wars between the airlines.123 CMIs often in-
clude opponent airlines matching discounts in one market by
another airline with extreme discounts in another market.
124
The DOJ argued that these and other similar tactics used in the
airline industry to set and maintain fare prices would become
easier as the number of airlines drops, and therefore this
merger should not be allowed. 25
The DOJ further argued that it was not only the drop in the
total number of major airlines, but the similarity in business
models of the new airlines that makes coordinated behavior
more likely. 126 The major airlines, the DOJ appeared to argue,
would start to look more like each other and would start to act
more like each other. For contrast, the DOJ once again pointed
to Southwest and Jet Blue, which have "business models that dif-
fer significantly" from the major airlines. 27 While these and
other LCCs have different fare and fee structures than the major
airlines, it appears that they are actually competing for different
markets of people.' 28 Thus, in an effort to help create some
119 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 108.
120 Complaint, supra note 3, 41.
121 Id.
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overlap between these differently modeled airlines and the ma-
jor players, the concessions required the newly merged Ameri-
can to include specific divestments to LCCs in major airports. 129
The DOJ hoped that by introducing and strengthening these
differently modeled airlines into major airports it could help
break up some of the coordination in the airline industry.
Further, while the airline industry appears rife with opportu-
nities for coordinated behavior, it appears that the DOJ was wary
about allowing this specific combination because of previous co-
ordinated behavior between its players. In fact, the Complaint
noted that the United States previously filed a lawsuit against
major airline players for coordinated behavior. 3 ° This case,
United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co.,"' focused on airlines'
use of the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATP), which is a
company that publishes real time information about each air-
line's individual pricing structure. 3 2 The United States averred
that the major airlines, including American, Continental, Delta,
Northwest, United, and US Airlines, were using the information
to coordinate their fare pricing. 133 This coordinated behavior,
the government argued, was hurting consumers and was in vio-
lation of antitrust regulations. 134 This case never went to trial
and was ultimately settled by a consent decree that is now ex-
pired.13 5 Despite this, the case is a good insight into the coordi-
nated behavior the DOJ feared between US Airways and
American Airlines.
2. Issues with the DOJ's Argument
The Airline Tariff Publishing case also showed that the DOJ's
questions about coordinated behavior in the airline industry
were rooted in broader policy concerns. However, in actuality,
this case raised more questions about why the other airline
mergers were allowed to succeed. The arguments of the case
were held in 1992,136 over a decade before the initial major air-
129 See Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
130 Complaint, supra note 3, 44.
131 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1993).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 10.
134 Id.
135 Complaint, supra note 3, 44.
136 Airline TariffPubl'g Co., 836 F. Supp. at 10-11.
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line mergers took place. 13 7 It is clear from its reference back to
this case in the current Complaint 38 that the behavior that was
the focus of the case is still a concern for the DOJ. Yet, the previ-
ous airline mergers were allowed to proceed, almost completely
unhindered. Possibly because each of these mergers reduced
the number of major airlines, and, using the DOJ's argument,
"[c] oordination becomes easier as the number of major airlines
dwindles .... ,,39 Consequently, it appears that the coordinated
behavior concerns should have been raised in each of the previ-
ous mergers. But these concerns never surfaced, and if they did,
they did not result in major concessions.
While the argument that the reduction from five to four ma-
jor airlines increased the potential for coordination follows both
evidence and reason, it appears this argument was accelerated
to new and costly heights in the Complaint. Further, while there
is some truth in the DOJ's belief that the combination would
create more similarly suited airlines, the previous mergers also
led to this result. In addition, as already addressed, the airline
industry has not been exceedingly profitable in recent years.
Thus, the push towards a new airline model may be a necessity
for the industry, and not just a way for greedy airlines to make
more money. It appears that while this may underpin some of
the DOJ's fears regarding the new merger; absent some other
concern, it is insufficient to mandate the large concessions
forced upon American.
C. THE PROTECTION OF LCCs
1. The DOJ's Position
As the Complaint 4 ° and, more pointedly, the concessions'
made clear, the DOJ was interested in protecting and promoting
the ability of low cost carrier airlines to compete with the major
airlines. These airlines, the DOJ argued, create competition
within the airline industry because they are structured differ-
ently and can price themselves differently than the major air-
lines.142 The availability of these airlines may help to provide





141 Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
142 Complaint, supra note 3, 47.
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consumers with more options to choose from when they are fly-
ing. The DOJ appeared to hope that these airlines would force
the other major airlines to compete on price as well as baggage
and cancellation fees.143 In light of these benefits, the DOJ felt
that ensuring a stable class of LCCs was important to protect the
airline industry as a whole.
However, ensuring that the LCCs stay in business is no simple
task. Because they are fundamentally different and smaller than
the other airlines, they have a harder time building the econo-
mies of scale that the larger airlines enjoy. In addition, they have
more difficulties obtaining slots and gates at airports that are
necessary for their flights.'4 The Complaint'45 and conces-
sions146 focused on the ability for LCCs to get gates at airports
where major airlines have large concentrations, specifically Rea-
gan National Airport. This airport services a majority of Wash-
ington D.C. and a large number of Congressmen and lobbyists
who may have played a role in this decision. The Complaint also
pointed to how JetBlue, a recent LCC entrant into this airport,
raised competition and lowered prices."' The Complaint then
went on to show that the merger, if allowed, may take the slot
rights away from JetBlue, which would block future LCC entry
into slots at this and other major airports. 48 The inability to get
slots is due in large part to an LCC's smaller size and inability to
quickly grow in size. On top of this, the LCCs face significant
responses by the other major airlines when they try to undercut
prices.' 49 The DOJ recognized that all of this amounts to "signifi-
cant barriers to success" for LCCs as well as for new airlines.'5 °
These barriers to success have existed in the airline industry
for almost as long as there have been major airlines. In fact, the
DOJ has previously sued American Airlines to protect these
LCCs. The case, United States v. AM Corp., focused on "preda-
tory pricing" practices that the DOJ argued American was using




146 Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
147 Complaint, supra note 3, 1 88.
148 Id.
149 Id. 1 9-94.
150 Id. 1 91.
151 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (D. Kan. 2001),
aff'd, 335 F.3d 1109.
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ing" is defined as pricing below a certain level for the purpose of
eliminating competition in the short run and making up the
losses from this low pricing from the reduction in competition
in the long run.152
The case centered around responses to new market condi-
tions created by growing LCCs at American Airlines's "home"
airport, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport (DFW).1 The DOJ claimed
that American responded to these growing LCCs by reducing its
prices and increasing the number of flights flown out of DFW.'54
As American took these actions, the LCCs saw their profits fall
and many were forced to move out of DFW.' 55 When the LCCs
left and the competition in DFW lessened, American then re-
sumed its previous fare and flight schedule. 156 While the LCCs
and the DOJ strenuously fought against American, the case was
ultimately dismissed, 157 and the dismissal was affirmed by the
10th Circuit Court of Appeals.15 8 The case shows both that the
DOJ has a history of protecting LCCs and that it has specifically
noted American to be a potential offender of these LCCs.
While it is unlikely that the DOJ attempted to block the Amer-
ican merger because this previous case was dismissed (I, for one,
hope that the DOJ is not that vindictive), it is more likely that
this previous case illustrates an example of the type of behavior
the DOJ feared may reoccur after the merger was complete. The
Complaint noted that the DOJ accepted that the prominence of
the major airlines was not in danger of being overtaken by the
LCCs.'5 9 However, the DOJ wanted to protect these airlines as a
way of preventing complete control over the industry arising
from the "cozy relationships" between the big four airlines.160
The concessions show that the DOJ was willing to go to extreme
and costly measures to protect the LCCs.
152 SeeBLAcK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY (10th ed. 2014); D.Jarrett Arp, Predatory Pricing
& Unfair Trade Practice, GIBSON DUNN (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn
.com/publications/Documents/Arp-PredatoryPricingAndUnfairTradePractices
.pdf.




157 Id. at 1194-96 (noting the government failed to show that American had
priced its flights at a level that was so low as to be inconsistent with business
practices).
158 See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
159 Complaint, supra note 3, 91.
160 Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
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2. Issues with the DOJ's Argument
The DOJ has long been aware of the importance of the LCCs
in preserving diversity and competition in the airline industry.
However, the Department has held its proverbial tongue in pro-
tecting these LCCs when the other major airlines merged. Why
is it that this merger gave rise to such extensive protections for
the LCCs? While the DOJ pointed to the reduction in airlines
from five to four, that argument seems insufficient for ordering
the divestment of approximately $200 million worth of airline
gates at a single airport. Like the reduction in number of air-
lines argument (addressed above), however, there is some evi-
dence that the DOJ was truly justified in its requirements on the
American merger because of its sincere desire to protect the
LCCs. However, it seems again that there is something still more
that drove the DOJ to order such incredible demands from the
new American.
D. PROTECTING THE CONSUMER
All three of the previous arguments of the DOJ dovetail in this
argument. The DOJ's main purpose in preventing antitrust and
anticompetitive behavior is eliminating harm to the consumer.
While the DOJ made different arguments about how it was at-
tempting to protect the consumer, the gist of its argument was
that a combination of American and US Airways would harm the
consumer. The DOJ's consumer protection position essentially
breaks down into three separate arguments: (1) the merger
would increase price for consumers; (2) the merger would force
American to forego its expansion plan; and (3) the merger
would force the new American to stop offering "Advantage
Fare" pricing offers.
Each of these arguments is addressed in its own sub-section
below, with counterpoints to each argument raised in the imme-
diately following sub-section. In addition, because all three of
these arguments are ultimately focused on consumer protec-
tion, a sub-section at the end of this part will address overarch-
ing issues related to this argument as a whole.
1. Increased Price
a. The DOJ's Position
The first consumer protection argument centers on the in-
creased price that consumers would have to pay in light of this
618
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merger. The DOJ, 161 and a number of commentators, 16 2 argued
that the mergers over the last decade and a half led to increased
fares and decreased services among the major airline providers.
While there is some research that suggests that it is not necessa-
rily true that an across-the-board increase in fares was a result of
the mergers, 163 it appears that the DOJ and many ordinary con-
sumers have associated the mergers with increases in prices. Spe-
cifically, the DOJ argued that consumers are seeing increased
prices for flights because of the increasing acceptance of "ancil-
lary" fees among major airlines, the reduction in price competi-
tive flights offered by major airlines, and a "capacity discipline"
being used among major airlines.164
Ancillary fees include fees on non-fare items, such as charging
for checked baggage and ticket change fees. 165 The Complaint
noted that these fees have been applied by the major airlines
over time in a "lockstep" method. 6 6 With this method, one of
the major airlines introduces or increases a fee and the others
make a similar change shortly thereafter.167 This process is used,
according to the Complaint, because the "success of any individ-
ual attempt to impose a new fee or fee increase depends on
whether the other [major airlines] follow suit. '"'6 8 The DOJ also
pointed out that they believe the new American would likely
lead to fee increases either through newly introduced fees169 or
through "fee harmonization," where the two merging airlines
adopt a common level for these ancillary fees. 170 The DOJ has
argued that increased consolidation in the market has been a
161 Complaint, supra note 3, 1.
162 Barbara E. Lichman, Airline Mergers Seriously Impacting Prices and Services, Avi-
ATION & AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT LAW NEWS (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.aviation-
airportdevelopmentlaw.com/2013/11/articles/aviation-and-airport-news/airline-
mergers-seriously-impacting-prices-and-services/.
163 Brad Seitz, The Myth and Reality of Airline Mergers And Higher Fares, Bus.
TRAVEL NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.businesstravelnews.com/More-News/
The-Myth-And-Reality-Of-Airline-Mergers-And-Higher-Fares/?ida=Airlines&a=
proc (pointing to a study that shows that over time not all airfare prices have
increased and many have decreased, and that the increases cannot necessarily be
tied to the mergers).
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driving force behind these fees, but without pointing to a spe-
cific reason why.1 71 However, the DOJ did specifically claim that
if US Airways and American Airlines were to be kept separate,
they could use reduced ancillary fees to compete with the other
major airlines. 72
The DOJ also expressed concerns that the merger would
"likely lead to increased industry-wide 'capacity discipline." ' 173
In the airline industry, this phrase means "restraining growth,"
or in some cases, reducing the currently offered services of the
airline in response to actions by other competitors.' The DOJ
pointed to evidence that each previous merger in the airline in-
dustry led to at least some capacity discipline.175
b. Issues with the DOJ's Argument
It seems arguable that in discussing fee increases in the airline
industry, especially from the many consumers that see them
every day, that a plan that encourages an airline to reduce ancil-
lary fees is a defensible strategy to take. However, these argu-
ments apparently failed in light of the previous mergers. While
the DOJ raised the concern that specific potential fee increases
were directly related to the proposed American merger, the ma-
jority of these increases were present in all the previously ap-
proved mergers. Encouraging US Airways and American
Airlines to stay separate as the two "smallest of the airlines" and
to compete with the other major airlines in terms of ancillary
prices seems akin to purposefully tying a hand (or a pocket-
book) behind someone's back to make them fight harder. While
it may make for a more enraged fighter, it more often than not
ends in the fighter's defeat. Analysts noted that blocking this
merger put these airlines "at a competitive disadvantage.' 7 6
In addition, while the DOJ made a convincing argument that
the use of capacity discipline may cause harm to consumers,





175 Id. 61-65 (The American West and US Airways merger lead to reduced
capacity, including cuts at Pittsburgh and Las Vegas. The Delta and Northwest
Airlines merger, "despite promises to the contrary," reduced capacity. The
United and Continental merger reduced capacity at "nearly all of its major hubs."
Finally, the Southwest and AirTran merger led to a reduction in services).
176 Karp, supra note 4.
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the previous airline mergers. Despite these concerns, the other
mergers were allowed without penalty. There does not appear to
be anything about the capacity discipline argument that applies
specifically to the American Airlines merger, nor does it appear
to justify this different treatment.
2. American Airlines Growth Plan
a. The DOJ's Position
The DOJ made an argument specific to American as well: By
keeping American as its own airline, the DOJ believed that it was
encouraging American's growth.' 7 7 For this argument, the DOJ
pointed specifically to American's 2011 placement of the "larg-
est order for new aircraft in the industry history."' 78 This expan-
sion plan was met with hostility in the airline industry.'79 The
other major airline players believed that if American was able to
implement its plan, they would have to come up with their own
strategies for growth, that in turn may disrupt the entire indus-
try.180 This disruption is something that the DOJ felt was neces-
sary for the airline industry to ensure competition and in turn to
protect the consumers from falling service offerings. This argu-
ment is one of the first encountered by this comment that is
specific to the American merger, and thus may serve as one of
the underlying reasons for the differing treatment between this
merger compared with the others.
b. Issues with the DOJ's Argument
However, while the argument is specific to the merger at
hand, it is based on a major, and ultimately invalid, assumption
that American would completely forego expansion after the
merger is complete.18 ' As it was working its way out of bank-
ruptcy, American introduced a plan that would allow it to retake
a role of airline prominence.1 2 One of the most important steps
was to launch a comprehensive expansion project, which began





182 Id.; Marc Scribner, The American/US Airways Case Highlights The Absurdity of
Antitrust Regulation, FoRBES (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/real-
spin/2013/1 1/22/the-americanus-airways-case-highlights-the-absurdity-of-anti-
trust-regulation/ (noting American's need to "modernize its aging aircraft
fleet").
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with the 2011 order addressed above. 1 3 The DOJ argued that
this expansion project would be abandoned if American were
allowed to merge.18 4 However, this seems a tenuous argument at
best. This is especially true when it is noted (perhaps with the
unfair advantage of foresight) that American did in fact go
through with a $2 billion expansion project after the merger."8 5
Further, because there is nothing in the concessions that ad-
dressed this expansion plan, this is not necessarily as persuasive
an argument against the merger as it initially appears to be. 8 6
While the DOJ argued that it sought to protect the interests of
the consumers, this argument ultimately does not fly as far as it
initially seems it would.
3. Advantage Fares Program
a. The DOJ's Position
A third way the DOJ feared consumers would be forced to pay
more after this merger is that the combining airlines would re-
duce their price competitive flight offerings. Specifically, the
DOJ feared that the merger would result in the elimination of
US Airways's "Advantage Fares" program. The Advantage Fares
Program was a unique offering by US Airways that offered cer-
tain flights for up to 40% off other services.1 8 7 The DOJ pro-
vided examples of how the Advantage Fare program would save
consumers money by giving them another option when flying
and by forcing some airlines to reduce their fares to compete.1 88
In merging with American, however, the DOJ feared that US
Airways would be forced to forego this option for travelers, be-
cause it would be subject to reactionary pricing by the other
three major competitors after the merger.18 1
This last argument is one of the strongest, and most specific
to American Airlines, that the DOJ made in its case against this
merger. Unlike many of the other arguments addressed above,
183 Complaint, supra note 3, 69.
184 Id. 70.
185 Going for Great, AMERICAN AIRLINES, http://www.aa.com/il8n/urls/going-
for-great.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (noting all of the new improvements
American is making after the merger).
186 See Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
187 Complaint, supra note 3, 77 7, 49.
188 Id. 7 48-54 (noting specific flight examples where "[a] dvantage fares have
proven highly disruptive to the industry's overall coordinated pricing dynamic").
189 Id. 1 55.
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the fear that consumers would be harmed by the discontinua-
tion of the Advantage Fare program is limited to this merger
alone.
b. Issues with the DOJ's Argument
The discontinuation of the Advantage Fare program remains
something that was always within US Airways's ability, even with-
out the merger. US Airways was struggling to compete with some
of the major airlines and it is arguable that its Advantage Fare
program may have helped to keep them afloat. However, it is
equally arguable that with the small profit margins present in
the airline industry, both today and for the foreseeable future,
US Airways may have decided to get rid of the Advantage Fare
program by itself in its need to raise more money. This would be
a business decision, though likely met with angry consumers,
which would not have drawn the ire of the DOJ. Thus, while this
argument is one of the strongest that the DOJ made specifically
about the American merger, it still remains a shaky argument
for invalidating what was really just another business decision by
US Airways.
4. Overall Issues with the DOJ's Consumer Protection Argument
Each of these consumer protection arguments had at its back-
ground a desire to stop the airlines from unfairly collecting in-
creased fees. It appears the DOJ believed these fares are unfairly
applied to the consumers. 90 The DOJ, and apparently even
some of the airlines, tied the fee increases to the consolidations
themselves. 9 ' However, many of these fees may, in actuality, be
due to the airline industry and the very thin margins present
therein.192 The former American Airlines CEO responded to
questions concerning the DOJ's initial attempt to block the
merger by saying: "If Airlines have a history of anticompetitive
behavior, they are the least able practitioners of the art in the
history of mankind." '93 This quip was designed to bring light to
the fact that many of the airlines' actions, while potentially
viewed as anticompetitive in nature, may actually be an attempt
to keep the airlines themselves in business.
190 Id. 1.
191 Id. 4.
192 Scribner, supra note 182.
193 Id.
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Viewing the actions of the airline industry as self-protective
rather than anticompetitive takes an even brighter light when
viewing all the recent bankruptcies that rocked the industry.194
Almost every major airline has filed for bankruptcy in the last
twenty years, a time period when many of the "anticompetitive"
behaviors discussed in this section, and complained of by the
DOJ in its Complaint, were taking place. While this does not
necessarily mean that they should be completely shielded from
anticompetitive review, viewed in this light, these actions are not
necessarily part of a greedy regime of major airlines. Instead
they may actually be more of an attempt to keep the airlines
airborne.
It appears that the challenge to this merger, and the large
concessions, may not be all based on the desire to prevent what
the DOJ feared was anticompetitive behavior. While it is likely
that these concerns may have led to easily adaptable legal argu-
ments in the DOJ's challenge, it appears, especially in light of
the previously approved mergers (many, if not all of which, had
these exact same concerns), that there was something else driv-
ing the DOJ's draconian approach to the American merger.
VI. POTENTIAL IMPLICIT REASONS FOR
THE DOJ'S CHALLENGE
This comment is not written to call attention to the inade-
quacy of the DOJ's arguments against the American merger.
These arguments, for the most part, are backed by the DOJ's
Horizontal Merger Guidelines and therefore the legal purpose
behind them is not questioned. However, as the previous Part
points out, these arguments by themselves do not explain the
difference between the DOJ's treatment of the American Air-
lines merger and the previously approved mergers.
This Part seeks to bring to light some of the potential implicit
reasons for the extensive concessions American was forced to
make. These reasons include: (1) increased pressure from con-
sumers; (2) changes in political leadership; and (3) changes to
policies. These may have been the actual background to the
DOJ's Complaint. While these reasons do not make a neat legal
argument, they nonetheless almost certainly made a major im-
pact on why the American Airlines merger met such stiff
opposition.
194 Yellin, supra note 2.
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After a discussion of these underlying reasons, the following
section expands on how these reasons may affect future chal-
lenges in large mergers. These predictions are based on extrap-
olations from how the DOJ acted in this specific merger, and
therefore remain predictions only. Further, because these rea-
sons and the policy underlying them may change over time, pre-
dicting how they will come to fruition in future cases is inexact.
However, many similar underlying issues that were prevalent in
the American deal will influence future treatment of mergers. It
remains important for those considering these deals to weigh
these undertones carefully.
A. CHANGES IN CONSUMER REACTIONS
As has been noted repeatedly above, antitrust issues were
prevalent not only in this merger, but in each one of the major
airline mergers that have been announced. 195 Each time a
merger was announced, many consumers feared that the price
of an airline flight was about to go up astronomically. 96 In each
of the previous mergers, as the DOJ's Complaint noted, there
were indeed increases on both flight prices and certain ancillary
fees.' 97 However, these increases did not reach the levels that
some consumers feared. 198 Despite this, these misgivings resur-
faced once again, and with renewed vigor, when the American
and US Airways merger was announced.
It appears that the DOJ's treatment of this merger was based
on these fears. As the concession language shows, the DOJ felt
that it was its job to protect consumers from mega-airlines. 199
The goal of the DOJ in its Complaint and the concessions was to
protect "consumers who benefit from both more competitive
prices and enhanced travel options. '200' In ordering the divest-
ments to the LCCs, the DOJ put a feather in its "consumer pro-
tection" hat by allowing these lower-cost airlines a chance to
compete. However, the question must be answered, why did the
DOJ feel it is so necessary to step in to protect consumers from
the American/US Airways merger, instead of in the previous air-
line mergers?
195 Supra Section V.D.
196 Lichman, supra note 162.
197 Complaint, supra note 3, 1.
198 Scribner, supra note 182.
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One reason for this change may have been the consumers'
increased awareness of the effect of the previous airline merg-
ers. While each previous merger was met with consumer trepida-
tion concerning its effect on prices, the Complaint made it clear
that in the years and months before this merger was announced,
these effects were being widely reported and better under-
stood.2 °1 In fact, the airlines themselves were only beginning to
see how mergers allowed them to increase their prices in 2011,
after the other mergers had been consummated.20 2 While the
consumers paid the increased prices that followed the previous
mergers, this may have been their first opportunity to protest a
merger before it was completed by using the information about
increased fees. In turn, the DOJ may have been able to point to
consumer unrest for the first time when defending its interfer-
ence with the deal.
Another potential reason for the increased consumer misgiv-
ings about the American Airlines merger is its distance from the
Recession of 2008. When Delta and Northwest Airlines merged
in April 2008, the U.S. was in the middle of one of the worst
recessions in recent history.203 And when both the new United
and the new Southwest were formed in 2010, the American
economy was still in the midst of its recovery. 2 4 However, when
American and US Airways launched their merger, a majority of
the U.S. economy had returned to pre-Recession norms. 2 5
While the DOJ's Complaint addressed this in its "no need" argu-
ment,206 the American public may have viewed this merger as
less necessary as well. While the proposed mergers may have
been more digestible to a consumer during the Recession and
the following recovery as a necessity, a merger announced in
better economic times may have been harder to swallow.
These consumer concerns may have been one of the major
drivers for the DOJ's work against the American merger. While
federal antitrust enforcement has always been tasked with pro-
201 Complaint, supra note 3, 1-4.
202 Id. 4.
203 Heidi Shierholz, Six Years from Its Beginning, the Great Recession's Shadow
Looms Over the Labor Market, ECON. POLICY INST. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.epi
.org/publication/years-begin ning-great-recessions-shadow/.
204 Annalyn Kurtz, Recession Ended 4 Years Ago: How Far Have We Come, CNN
MONEY (May 4, 2013), http://economy.money.cnn.com/2013/06/04/recession-
ended-4-years-ago/.
205 Id.
206 See supra Section V.A. 1.
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tecting consumers, the consumer distrust of this specific merger
may have actually sparked the DOJ into action.
B. CHANGES IN POLICY
When the concessions for the American Airlines merger were
announced, Attorney General Eric Holder noted that the
"agreement has the potential to shift the landscape of the airline
industry. ' 20 7 It is evident the DOJ intended these concessions to
serve as precedent for future major mergers in the airline indus-
try and potentially as a signal for how the DOJ would resolve
conflicts for major mergers in other industries as well. But why
make such a signal now? While this drastic step was not ad-
dressed in the Complaint, other considerations may have led the
DOJ to adopt this new policy towards mega-mergers. Examining
the recent changes in antitrust policy as a whole helps shed light
on why this change was adopted and will remain important in
determining how the DOJ might rule in future mergers.
One of these policy changes is a new draft of the DOJ Anti-
trust Division's "Policy Guide to Merger Remedies" (Policy
Guide). 208 This draft was released in June of 2011, less than two
months after the DOJ reviewed the Southwest Airlines and Air-
Tran merger, the last major merger before American Airlines. 2 9
The Policy Guide was an update to a previous edition, drafted in
2004,210 and was designed to help the DOJ review potential hori-
211zontal mergers. In the Policy Guide, the DOJ notes that when
companies attempt to merge, the "parties frequently seek to
avoid litigation by offering to cure the Division's concerns when
the Division determines the proposed merger is illegal. '21 2 In
light of this, the Policy Guide allows the DOJ to consider "a
broad range of potential remedies" to avoid litigation with the
parties. 213 The main focus of these remedies is to "effectively
preserve competition in the relevant market. 21
4
207 Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
208 See Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
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Compared to the 2004 draft, the 2011 Policy Guide gives the
DOJ more "flexibility" in dealing with challenged mergers.215
This increased flexibility allows the DOJ to use more types of
remedies than they could before. 16 One of the newer remedies
that the DOJ is specifically authorized to pursue in settling a
challenged merger is the divesture of assets to another buyer.2 17
These divestitures "must be substantial enough to enable the
purchaser to effectively preserve competition. 218 While these
divestures are not an entirely new remedy for challenged merg-
ers,219 the Policy Guide empowers the DOJ to require them in a
more straightforward and certain manner. By mandating Ameri-
can to divest 148 of its airport gates and slots, 22 0 some of which
were worth approximately $2 million each,2  it is clear that the
DOJ is already more than comfortable with exercising this
remedy.
The 2011 Policy Guide was updated to "reflect[ ] the changes
in the merger landscape and the lessons the division has learned
from the remedies it has entered since the issuance of the origi-
nal guide in 2004. ' '222 In addition to these lessons, this Policy
Guide almost certainly reflects the changes in antitrust policy
the DOJ has undergone in the last several years. While the re-
quired divestitures were "groundbreaking 221 in the area of air-
line mergers, the policy of enforcing these divestiture remedies
is now embedded in the very policy of the DOJ. As the next sec-
tion points out, this policy stems in large part from the political
powers of the time, and with changes in the near future to the
current political structure, it remains to be seen exactly how
they will affect future mega-mergers.
215 MAUREEN McGuiRL, 2 CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS Ch. 17,
§ 17.04 (Matthew Bender 2015), LexisNexis.
216 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, Ch. 32, § 32.02 (Matthew Bender,
2d ed. 2015), LexisNexis.
217 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 208, at 2-11.
218 Id.
219 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-31
(1961) ("Divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust remedies. It
is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should be in the forefront of a
court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found.").
220 Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5.
221 Complaint, supra note 3, 30.
222 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division Issues Updated
Merger Remedies Guide (June 17, 2011).
223 Press Release, Justice Department Requires Airlines to Divest Facilities,
supra note 5 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer).
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C. CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP
In his bid for office, President Obama criticized the preceding
Bush administration for having the "weakest record of antitrust
enforcement of any administration in the last half century." '224
He promised that, if elected, he would increase enforcement
measures to stop anticompetitive and antitrust issues.225 There-
fore, when he was elected in 2008, many believed that a new
wave of antitrust policy was not far behind. In the first years of
his presidency, there were strides toward increased enforcement
of antitrust issues, including a redraft of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines in 2010,226 which was analyzed at length above, and a
new draft of the Policy Guide to Merger Remedies in 2011.227
These new drafts altered the focus of merger antitrust chal-
lenges and increased the possibility for "behavioral remedies"
that allow a merger to proceed after the parties agree to certain
commitments. These behavioral remedies appear to give the
DOJ more authority to seek certain concessions from merging
companies.
Newly named Attorney General Eric Holder assisted President
Obama in revising these policies and in reinvigorating the ad-
ministration's antitrust enforcement.228 As mentioned above,
Holder's nomination occurred before the United merger and
was completed in 2009. Analysts at the time expected Holder to
push forward President Obama's enforcement of antitrust is-
sues.229 Further, many in the airline industry expected a more
complex review than the previous merger between Northwest
and Delta, which took place during the Bush Administration. 230
Despite these concerns, the United merger was allowed to take
place after the new airline agreed to give up transfer slots to
224 David A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust En-
forcement?, 65 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 13 (July 18, 2012), www.stanfordlawreview
.org/online/obama-antitrust-enforcement; Senator Barack Obama, Statement
for the American Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.antitrustinsti-
tute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07-0927
20071759.pdf.
225 Crane, supra note 224, at 13.
226 Id.; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 108.
227 Crane, supra note 224; Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra
note 208.
228 White House Profile: Eric Holder, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/author/Eric%20Holder (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
229 Bobelin, supra note 52.
230 United and Continental Announce Merger, supra note 50.
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Southwest Airlines at Newark International Airport,231 a small
demand compared to American's.
Although concerns that the new AG might put a stop to air-
line mergers were not immediately realized, it appears that even
before the new Policy Guide to Merger Remedies was published,
the AG felt that these concessions were available. In the Ameri-
can Airlines merger, armed with the newly revised and ex-
panded Policy Guide, it appears that Mr. Holder was able to take
a more exacting approach to exercising these behavioral
remedies.
In addition to these changes at a broad level of executive poli-
cymaking, there was an even more recent change that may truly
punctuate the DOJ's change here. This was the confirmation of
William J. Baer as the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for the
DOJ's antitrust division in December of 2012.232 Mr. Baer is "rec-
ognized as a leading and influential antitrust lawyer," and previ-
ously served as the Director for the Bureau of Competition at
the Federal Trade Commission.2 3 While serving for the FTC,
Mr. Baer was deemed the "eager sheriff' for his antitrust prac-
tices and for leading "easily the most aggressive antitrust activity
in 25 years. ' 23 4 At the FTC, he presided over many complex anti-
trust cases including suits against the merger of Staples and Of-
fice Depot, as well as against major companies like Toy's-R-Us
and Intel for using their market power for predatory conduct.23 5
He is also noted for forcing companies to take what was seen as
a controversial step of engaging in large divestitures in order to
merge. 236 For example, under his purview, Exxon-Mobil was
forced to pay the largest FTC divesture ever to merge in 1999,
which included the sell-off of over 2,000 gas stations.237 As AAG
231 Press Release, United Airlines and Continental Airlines Transfer Assets to
Southwest Airlines in Response to Department of Justice's Antitrust Concerns
(Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-airlines-and-continental-
airlines-transfer-assets-southwest-airlines-response.
232 Meet the Assistant Attorney General, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
atr/about/baer.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
233 Id.
234 Susan B. Garland, Trustbuster William Baer: The FFC's Eager Sheriff BLOOM-
BERG (July 5, 1998), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1998-07-05/trust-
buster-william-baer-the-ftcs-eager-sheriff (noting that in five months Mr. Baer
opposed twenty mergers, compared to the average of twenty-two oppositions a
year preceding his arrival).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Press Release, Exxon/Mobil Agree to Largest FTC Divestiture Ever in Or-
der to Settle FTC Antitrust Charges; Settlement Requires Extensive Restructuring
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for the Antitrust Division, Mr. Baer has already challenged other
major mergers, including the take-over of Grupo Modelo by
Anheuser-Busch.238
In turn, when Mr. Baer announced that the DOJ would be
challenging the American merger, those who knew his history
were not completely surprised.239 While this sort of challenge to
airline mergers was new, it was perfectly in line with the antitrust
challenges that Mr. Baer had previously spearheaded. Further,
when the concessions of the new American were announced,
those who had studied the history of Mr. Baer likely expected to
see the divesture requirement in place.24 ° Mr. Baer's willingness
to challenge a merger and demand divestiture and the newly
revised and expanded allowance of "behavioral remedies" ap-
pear to have coincided-much to the expense of American
Airlines.
These changes in antitrust leadership may have played a ma-
jor role in the increased challenge that American Airlines faced.
Business analysts felt that the DOJ's challenge was an "indication
of Mr. Baer's leadership, 241 which was part of the larger
changes over antitrust policy and enforcement prior to the an-
nouncement of the merger. Additionally, some of the people
that influenced these factors may be changing, including the
confirmation of Loretta Lynch as Attorney General,242 who
served on the New York Federal Reserve Board at a time when
"big business" faced extreme scrutiny.243 Regardless of the peo-
ple in charge, however, these political influences that may have
caused the DOJ to act against American Airlines are important
to highlight because they help bring to light the political under-
pinnings of future complaints of this kind. While these factors
were not openly addressed in the Complaint, it appears that
and Prevents Merger of Significant Competing U.S. Assets, (Nov. 30, 1999),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/11/exxonmobil-agree-larg-
est-ftc-divestiture-ever-order-settle-ftc.
238 Peter Coy, Meet Bill Baer, the Trustbuster Blocking the Airline Merger, BLOOM-
BERG (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/201-3-08-13/
meet-bill-baer-the-trustbuster-blocking-the-airline-merger.
239 Id.
240 See Garland, supra note 234.
241 Scribner, supra note 182.
242 Meet the Attorney General, DEP'T OFJUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/meet-
attorney-general (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
243 David Dayen, Loretta Lynch's Wall Street Friends: What You Should Know About
AG Nominee's Finance Past, SALON (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/
1 1/10/lorettajlynchs wallstreetfriendswhatyou-should know about ag_
nomineesfinance-past/.
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they nonetheless played an exceedingly important role. These
political aspects need to be a consideration for future mergers
and it remains important to look between the words that are
used explicitly by the DOJ.
VII. THE EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES ON FUTURE
PROPOSED MERGERS
The DOJ's Guidelines note that an analysis of the effect of a
proposed merger is "necessarily predictive. 244 Thus, an analysis
of how changes in merger regulations will effect how the DOJ
analyzes future mergers is doubly so. Further, because of the
changes inherent in the country's political future, the reasons
addressed above may change. However, a prediction of these fu-
ture reviews is one of the most important reasons for analyzing
the American Airlines merger so closely. When there is nothing
solid to stand on in the legal realm, it is often the most comfort-
ing to at least cling to precedent, and so this comment clings.
In the aftermath of the American merger, the DOJ faced a
number of other major mergers, including Sprint's attempt to
buy out T-Mobile and the merger between 21st Century Fox and
Time Warner.245 However, both of these mergers were aban-
doned without the DOJ ever filing a case.246 While the years
before the American deal had been marked with major mergers,
including the many major airline mergers discussed above, com-
mentators felt that these mergers were ultimately called off be-
cause the companies were unwary of the DOJ's "recent
aggressive enforcement efforts," which undoubtedly includes its
challenge of American. 247 Business people in all industries must
now consider each proposed merger in light of the millions of
dollars of divestitures that the DOJ has already authorized. Even
the DOJ's antitrust "attack dog, '24 8 Mr. Bill Baer, appears to rest
on the haunches of the DOJ's "willingness and ability" to strictly
enforce antitrust regulations.249
However, the strong hand of the DOJ has not siphoned off
large mergers completely. In fact, 2014 saw many sizable merg-
244 HoRIzoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 1.
245 James B. Stewart, For Mergers, a Shadow of Antitrust Challenges, N.Y. TIMES




248 Scribner, supra note 182.
249 Stewart, supra note 245.
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ers completed, including a $5 billion merger between Oracle
and Micros250 and a $34.6 billion merger of oil field competitors
Halliburton and Baker Hughes. 2 1 Additionally, in 2015, Charter
Communications and Time Warner Cable agreed to merge 25 2
and Family Dollar and Dollar Tree closed their merger in
July. 253
In the airline industry specifically, there have not been any
other notable mergers since the new American was formed. Fur-
ther, as the DOJ specifically argued, the consequences of reduc-
ing the number of major airlines from five to four lead many to
believe it is highly unlikely that there will be another major air-
line merger approved. If creating the fourth major airline cost
hundreds of millions of dollars, what would it cost to go down to
three? However, as seen in the concession, the DOJ has a desire
to protect the future of LCCs in the airline industry. Therefore,
there are some in the airline industry who still see a potential for
future consolidations within this group of smaller airlines,25 4 al-
beit at the different end of the airline scale than the American
merger.
In every industry, however, it is clear that the DOJ's antitrust
presence and influence is felt. The DOJ's Guidelines recognize
that many mergers are "competitively beneficial or neutral. 25 5
However, it is the DOJ who ultimately will decide whether or not
the merger is allowable, and what remedies (if any) are neces-
sary. Unquestionably, the DOJ has much power, and as the
American challenge shows, it is not afraid to use it. This fear, for
250 2015 Mergers and Acquisitions: Anticipated Deals Going Down This Year, MONEY
MORNING (Jan. 21, 2015), http://moneymorning.com/2015/01/21/2015-merg-
ers-and-acquisitions-anticipated-deals-going-down-this-year/.
251 Michael J. De La Merced, Halliburton and Baker Hughes Agree to Friendly $34.6
Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
11 / 1 7/halliburton-to-buy-baker-hughes-for-34-billion/.
252 Press Release, Charter Communications to Merge with Time Warner Cable




253 Katherine Peralta, Dollar Tree Completes Purchase of Family Dollar, ClARLOTrE
OBSERVER (July 6, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/arti-
cle26568373.html.
254 Ben Mutzabaugh, Airline Merger Mania Over? Not So, Says Industry Veteran,
USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/
2015/01/2 1/airline-merger-mania-over-not-so-says-industry-veteran/22101281 /
(discussing the potential for low cost, and ultra low cost airlines to merge in the
future).
255 HoRizoTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 1.
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lack of a better business term, of the DOJ's power appears to be
partially behind the DOJs strict policy in American. As Mr. Baer
stated "[t]here's a real value to having companies considering a
strategic merger to think about the role of antitrust enforce-
ment .... "256
VIII. CONCLUSION
The DOJ, no doubt, took exacting steps they argued were nec-
essary to "protect consumers" through its challenge and de-
manded concessions of American Airlines. The DOJ initially
challenged the merger on the grounds of enforcing antitrust
law; however, it appears that these arguments were influenced
by other, stronger outside forces. These forces and the steps
taken in this deal had effects far outside the airline industry and
will be part of the consideration of every business leader plan-
ning a merger. While the words of the Complaint encompassed
the DOJ's legal argument against a specific merger, the underly-
ing forces shed light on the reasons and political influences that
stand before all mergers.
The new American Airlines has adopted a new slogan, bought
new airplanes, and even created an entire new brand after the
DOJ approved its creation. It has set out to improve many of the
areas where it believed it was behind other airlines and has
spent billions of dollars in purchasing and improving new air-
craft. It is believed that the merger has helped save the com-
pany. However, before any of this could happen, the merger
had to survive a most unexpected and unprecedented antitrust
challenge.
While the DOJ argued that the merger should be stopped be-
cause it was not necessary, it would lead to anticompetitive re-
sults, it would hurt smaller airlines, and it would harm
consumers, none of these arguments, alone or together, sup-
ported the magnitude of the challenge that American faced. In-
stead, it is only when the layers of this challenge are peeled
back, and the other intrinsic reasons are analyzed, including the
changes in consumer reaction, politics, and political leaders,
that the underlying cause of this challenge becomes more clear.
While the DOJ advanced legal reasons against the merger, these
underlying influences likely had more import in the fight
against American.
256 Stewart, supra note 245.
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While there is a new American today, the turbulent path to its
creation shows the importance of considering both legal and po-






The subscription price for four issues is $42.00 per year; foreign sub-
scriptions are $49.00 per year. Regular single issues are available at
$16.50 per copy. Add 8.25% tax on single issue orders within the
State of Texas. Tax-exempt institutions must include copy of exemp-
tion certificate with order. An additional charge will be made for








AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A Publication of the SMU Law Review Association
Published since 1930, the Journal is the world's foremost scholarly
publication dealing exclusively with the legal and economic aspects
of aviation and space. The quarterly Journal is edited and managed
by a student Board of Editors. Each volume features comprehensive
leading articles; a review of items of current international interest; a
sizable section of student comments, case notes, and recent deci-
sions; book reviews; and a bibliography of current aviation and space
literature.




Domestic $43.00; Foreign $50.00
Address inquiries to:
JOURNAL oF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE





Please notify us of any change of name or address:
New Address:
Old Address:*
(Name of Firm or Individual)
(City) (State) (Zip Code)
(Name of Firm or Individual)
(City)
* Give your old
mailing label.
(State) (Zip Code)
name and address as it appears on the most recent
Complete and mail this form to:
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas 75275-0116
